# INVESTMENT GUIDE

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## In this issue:

WHAT RATE OF RETURN CAN AN INVESTOR EXPECT? Despite the pronouncements of the talking heads, columnists, brokerage firm seers, and others, no one can tell what 2001 will bring for the financial markets.

Our investment approach is based on an acknowledgment of that fact. Our goal is to select low-cost vehicles that have demonstrated attractive long-term returns in relation to their volatility (risk). These can be used as building blocks for our readers' and clients' portfolios. We tend to overweigh large capitalization value stocks because they have had the most favorable returns in relation to volatility, but we also recommend including some growth stocks and foreign issues. Index funds with low turnover and low expenses are the best way to go about this (pp. 90-92).

**INVESTING IN SWITZERLAND IS GETTING MORE EXPENSIVE:** The latest tax convention between Switzerland and the United States means that U.S. persons have little or no reason left for holding assets in Switzerland (p. 91).

WHITHER MA BELL? Investors who have been long accustomed to thinking of AT&T as a giant paragon of stability were rudely shocked by its recent dividend cut (pp. 93-94).

ALTERNATIVE HIGH-YIELD DOW INVESTMENT STRATEGY: Chevron (no longer in the Dow), 3M, and JP Morgan continue to be sold off and replaced with Caterpillar, DuPont, and AT&T (p. 94).

#### THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS RANKED BY YIELD: Caterpillar, International Paper and Goodyear have

helped revive the "dogs of the Dow" (p. 95).

**RECENT MARKET STATISTICS:** (*p. 96*). **Online: www.americaninvestment.com** 

## Is a "Soft Landing" Still Possible?

Despite the rapid deterioration of the leading indicators during recent months, the prevailing view on Wall Street and in Washington D.C. seems to be that economic growth will slow from the pace of recent years, but that there will be no recession. When President-elect Bush visited the White House on December 19, President Clinton noted that "I don't think we're going to have that [a recession] ...But I think there are things to be managed. He [the President Elect] will have challenges and we ought to give him a chance to meet them ...."

Just what might some of these challenges be?

The foremost is the possibility that consumers are in the process of a major retrenchment now that they are finding that stock market profits are not a realistic substitute for savings. During recent years, personal savings have decreased toward zero, even as stock market and real estate gains boosted households' net worth. U.S. common stocks have, by some estimates, shed more than \$3 trillion of value from the lofty peaks reached earlier this year. Those peaks were short lived, yet it is clear that the value of households' equity holdings, direct and via mutual fund shares, will have decreased during the year 2000 for the first time since 1994, probably by the largest percentage drop since 1973.

At the same time, the dollar, which had been very strong during the 1990s despite a widening trade deficit, has begun to weaken in the foreign exchange markets. A continued slide of the dollar could prompt foreign investors to leave U.S. markets and, by raising the cost of imports, enable U.S. producers to raise prices. Attempting to defend the dollar and to restrain price inflation could make it more difficult for U.S. monetary authorities to cut interest rates. Indeed, at its most recent meeting, the Federal Reserve Board, although indicating that it now views the possibility of a recession as a greater threat than an acceleration of price inflation, decided to make no changes in its discount rate or its Federal Funds target rate. Even if, as is widely expected, the Fed does cut rates during the months ahead, monetary policy might not be very effective in shoring up either spending or the securities and foreign exchange markets. Reportedly, one-fifth of bank holdings of business loans are in various "troubled loan" categories. Commercial and industrial loans are at an all-time high in relation to business inventories, and faltering sales could quickly boost unsold inventories and non-performing loans alike. The resulting pressures on lending margins could make the banks reluctant to lower their rates for any but the most creditworthy borrowers.

In these circumstances, it might seem that the major across-the-board tax cut favored by President-elect Bush during the election campaign would be the most promising means of putting funds in the hands of consumers and businesses. Unfortunately, the delays and uncertainties of the legislative process render fiscal policy virtually useless for contra-cyclical purposes. In short, Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve are the ones on the spot; having brought on the long-awaited slowdown, it remains to be seen whether they can stop it from developing into a recession.

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## WHAT RATE OF RETURN CAN AN INVESTOR REASONABLY EXPECT?

The year 2000 was not kind to equity investors. Nearly all the broad stock indexes were down for the 12 months, and those who plunged into the "new economy" (technology stocks) late probably have been badly burned.

As the *Bank Credit Analyst*<sup>1</sup> recently observed "The air is now thick with predictions for 2001. As might be expected, most Wall Street strategists are as bullish as ever—many have simply made their old end-2000 target their new target for the end-2001. The idea that the stock market could perform poorly for two years in a row seems inconceivable to an industry that grew prosperous feeding on five successive years of double-digit gains during the second half of the '90s."

What are our predictions? Where do we think, say, the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be a year from now? Our answer to such questions is that we have no idea. Our *hunch* is that the bear market has considerably more to run, and we are as certain as we can be of anything that the 20% or so annual returns that common stock investors have enjoyed since 1982 are unlikely to be realized over the next 18 years.

<sup>1</sup> BCA Publications Ltd., 102 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal Quebec, Canada, H3A 3L6.

## **Risk and Return**

That said, it is impossible to discuss returns, either historical or prospective, without mentioning risk. Returns are easy to quantify, as in the table below, which shows the annual returns for various types of investments for the 22 years 1979 through 2000 (the returns for 2000 are for the first 11 months only). Risk, on the other hand, is far less clearly appraised in the typical investor's mind.

Most simplistically, a holding that loses value is often deemed to have been risky. As indicated in the table, there was only one of the nine types of holdings, 6 mos. Treasury bills, that did not generate a loss in at least one of the past 22 years. It is no coincidence that T-bills also provided the lowest average return of the 9 possibilities in the table. Investors seeking higher returns than those offered by T-bills, or bank accounts and Certificates of Deposit, perforce have to recognize that disappointing returns and even losses are to be expected over relatively short periods.

A more rigorous way of evaluating risk is the *standard deviation* of the annual returns. This is a mathematical measure of variability—the higher the standard deviation, the less dependable, in this instance, the annual returns. As indicated

ANNUAL RETURNS FOR SELECTED ASSET CLASSES

in the table, the standard deviation of the returns on the fixed income possibilities is in line with expectations—it is higher for the higher-yielding intermediate and long-term bonds. The standard deviation is not so well behaved for the equity returns, where the possibilities with the most variable returns over the 22 years, small capitalization growth stocks and foreign stocks, did not provide the highest overall returns.

This may reflect the unusual categories we have selected. The division of domestic equities into large and small capitalization issues and again into growth and value stocks reflect the methodology of Professors Eugene Fama and Ken French, of the University of Chicago and Yale, respectively. They begin by determining the median capitalization of issues listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). They exclude certain issues such as regulated utilities, closed-end funds and unit trusts, companies in receivership, recent IPOs, etc. Issues traded on the Nasdaq or on the American Stock Exchange are classified as small unless their market capitalization is larger than the median on the NYSE.

Another reason why the standard deviation of the equity series returns is not always larger when the average annual

				————Fixed Income———-					
	Large Capitalization		Small Cap	uities italization	Russell		6 Month	Inter-	Long term
	Growth	Value	Growth	Value	Mid Cap.	Foreign	T-Bills	Mediate	Treasuries
1979	20.7	23.8	47.3	38.0	32.5	6.2	9.7	6.0	-1.2
1980	33.9	16.5	46.1	29.1	32.5	24.4	11.7	6.4	-4.0
1981	-7.9	11.2	-4.1	10.5	2.4	-1.0	17.6	10.5	1.9
1982	17.6	27.4	26.0	37.7	23.3	-0.8	13.7	26.1	40.4
1983	16.2	26.8	26.9	44.2	23.8	24.6	9.3	8.6	0.7
1984	-1.1	14.1	-8.9	5.1	1.4	7.9	11.6	14.4	15.5
1985	31.5	29.5	28.5	34.7	32.0	56.7	9.2	18.1	31.0
1986	13.7	20.4	5.8	16.9	18.2	70.0	7.3	13.1	24.5
1987	6.4	2.3	-10.0	-6.3	0.2	24.9	6.6	3.7	-2.7
1988	12.8	24.6	20.5	28.8	19.8	28.6	6.9	6.7	9.7
1989	31.5	28.4	19.1	19.7	26.3	10.8	9.3	12.7	18.1
1990	1.4	-13.9	-18.1	-20.8	-11.5	-23.2	8.7	9.2	6.2
1991	41.1	29.8	52.1	39.4	41.5	12.5	7.2	14.6	19.3
1992	7.1	21.2	11.2	29.9	16.4	-11.8	4.3	7.2	9.4
1993	2.0	21.2	14.0	22.6	14.3	32.9	3.4	8.8	18.2
1994	1.5	-4.6	-2.9	-1.0	-2.1	8.0	3.9	-2.2	-7.8
1995	37.9	37.2	31.3	29.2	34.5	11.6	6.6	15.3	31.7
1996	21.2	15.7	12.9	21.4	19.0	6.2	5.3	4.1	-0.9
1997	30.3	31.7	16.3	34.4	29.0	2.0	5.6	7.9	15.9
1998	33.6	14.9	0.4	-7.0	10.1	20.3	5.6	8.4	13.1
1999	28.2	1.9	47.7	10.8	18.2	27.3	4.6	0.4	-9.0
2000	-13.7	2.7	-19.9	-4.1	0.6	-16.9	5.8	8.1	18.6
Avg. Return	16.4	17.5	14.3	18.3	17.4	13.3	8.2	9.8	11.1
Std. Deviation	19.5	16.6	26.5	18.8	19.3	19.5	1.4	5.3	11.1
No. Down yrs.	3	2	6	5	2	5	0	1	6

Note: The large and small capitalizations, value and growth series are the Fama French series described in the text. The foreign stock series includes Europe, Austrialia and Far East Asia. The Lehman Intermediate bond series includes both government and corporate bonds of 3.5 to 4 years maturity, and the long-term Treasury bond series is for a 20 year maturity. The results for 2000 are through November.

returns are larger could be that the standard deviation may not reflect everything that might be considered risk.

## Growth vs. Value

Most investors have a general idea of what constitutes a growth stock and what constitutes a value stock, but there are many ways to define them. A value-oriented investor may hold a given issue because it meets his or her specific criteria, yet the same issue may be held by another investor in the belief and expectation that it offers superior growth prospects. Generally speaking, growth stocks will have relatively high returns on equity, high growth rates of sales and earnings, etc., as well as high price/earnings and price-to-book ratios, and low dividend yields. Value stocks will have low price-to-book value ratios, low price/earnings multiples, and above average dividend yields. Value stocks are often "turnaround" situations that value investors believe have been beaten down in price to unwarranted levels, so that the issue sells below some intrinsic value.

Within the large and small capitalization universes as defined in the series in the table and in the chart on p. 92, the growth issues are defined as the 30 percent of companies with the lowest ratios of book value to market capitalization, and the value issues are the 30 percent with the highest ratios of book value to market capitalization. (This means that the 40 percent of issues in the middle of each category are not included at all). These divisions are designed to highlight differences in investment strategies or "styles" among investment managers. The Fama-French series mimic the selections of, and serve as a "yardstick" for the results of, portfolio managers who follow a stated strategy of investing in growth or value stocks.

## Active vs. Passive Management

Investment managers may be classified by their approach to investing. Two broad categories, reflecting different belief systems regarding the behavior of capital markets, are usually referred to as active and passive. Active management is the traditional way of building a securities portfolio, and may include a wide variety of strategies for identifying issues that appear to offer above-average returns. As discussed above, one manager might focus on companies with impressive growth in sales and profits, another on firms with promising new products, a third **F**or investors who want individualized management of their assets, we offer two discretionary management services: Our Professional Asset Management (PAM) service covers all of our recommended assets, and allows us to place trades in stocks, bonds, and mutual funds directly in our clients' accounts. (The accounts remain the property of our clients at all times—we are only authorized to trade on their behalf.) Our High-Yield Dow (HYD) service operates similarly, except it invests strictly in the highest-yielding Dow stocks, using the 4-for-18 model on a fully invested basis. Investors interested in these low-cost services should contact us at 413-528-1216 or Fax 413-528-0103.

## on turnaround situations.

Regardless of their individual approaches, all active managers purchase securities selectively based on some forecast of future events. Implicit in this idea is the belief that carefully selected securities will produce higher rates of return than those chosen at random. Active managers periodically reshuffle their portfolios in an effort to keep them stocked with only the most promising securities. The costs associated with generating and implementing these revisions make active management the most expensive investment approach. These expenses are passed along to the client. Studies of money managers' performance over the past fifty years offer powerful evidence that active managers as a group are unable to generate investment returns high enough to recoup these costs and extract excess profits.

Passive managers (sometimes called index managers) make no forecasts of the stock market or the economy, and no effort to distinguish "attractive" from "un-

attractive" securities. Passive managers often construct their portfolios to mirror the performance of well-recognized market benchmarks such as the Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index (500 large U.S. companies), Russell 2000 Index (2000 small U.S. companies), or Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE index (large international companies). A passive manager investing in large U.S. companies, for example, makes no determination if Ford is preferable to General Motors, Coca-Cola to Pepsi, or Campbell Soup to Kellogg. Instead he or she simply buys everything from Abbott Laboratories to Xerox, resulting in a portfolio with hundreds of stocks. Portfolio adjustments are made only in response to changes in the underlying universe or index, e.g., when Chrysler disappears in a merger with Daimler Benz, or a new company such as Microsoft joins the ranks of large company stocks. Passive investment products first appeared in 1973 and have become increasingly popular, with over \$1 trillion worldwide dedicated to various indexed

## INVESTING IN SWITZERLAND IS GETTING MORE EXPENSIVE

**A** new Tax Convention between the Swiss Confederation and the United States becomes effective January 1. The terms of the tax treaty provide that U.S. citizens who invest in U.S. domestic securities through a foreign bank or intermediary must declare such ownership with the U.S. Government by filing a completed Internal Revenue Service Form W-9 (Request for Taxpayer Identification Number and Certification). A Form W-9 or some other disclosure and reporting authorization must be submitted to a Swiss bank or other qualified intermediary to avoid the withholding of a nonrefundable tax of 31% on income and gains produced by U.S. securities. Foreign banks and qualified intermediaries are required to seek such information from U.S. investors holding U.S. investments in foreign accounts to assure that foreign banks will be able to claim a refund of U.S. taxes withheld from non-U.S. investors.

This Tax Convention is the latest effort to end the ability of U.S. persons to take advantage of privacy laws applicable in Switzerland and in other foreign jurisdictions. It would seem that U.S. investors who continue to hold investment in U.S. securities in foreign banks have three alternatives:

- 1. Complete IRS Form W-9, identifying themselves as a holder of U.S. securities in a foreign account,
- 2. Agree to the nonrefundable 31% withholding tax,
- 3. Liquidate U.S. investments held in a foreign account.

We recommend the liquidation of all U.S. investments held in foreign accounts and reinvestment, if appropriate, in the United States.

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strategies in 1997.

As it has evolved over the years, our approach now leans toward the passive. Our High Yield Dow approach is a passive approach—we let the numbers do the picking for us, and the mutual funds we recommend are generally index funds, with low expense ratios and turnover. By now, many studies have concluded that simple selection methods consistently applied produce returns that are superior to actively managed funds, whether growth or value oriented. The much higher costs of active management are but one reason for this. In addition, there is no reason to believe that active managers who manage to do better than the indexes for some period will repeat their performance in a future period.

Where possible, we prefer what some call a "structured" approach, which recognizes that popular benchmarks for equity or fixed income securities were developed as simple signposts of financial performance and were not intended to serve as blueprints for actual investment strategies. Structured and passive investing strategies share a common belief that market prices are the best estimate of value. Hence, neither attempts to beat the market through superior security selection. There is reason to believe passive and structured investors are smart not to try to beat the market. Security prices reflect the collective judgment of investors regarding the appropriate price to pay when balancing prospective risk and re-

ward. Academic research has focused on identifying the risk factors investors appear to care about in determining these prices. Bearing risk is what investors get paid for-the more clearly we can define risk, the better we can predict the expected returns that come with it. The structured approach takes insights about risk characteristics and designs investment products to isolate and capture them in a precise way. The resulting strategies may not necessarily match familiar equity or fixed income indexes, but often represent a more scientific approach to designing the asset class "building blocks" used to develop a total portfolio.

Index funds that slavishly follow a specific index face special problems of their own. For example, the annual reconstitution of the Russell 2000 index in June 1998 produced 523 new names. Index managers forced to buy these names may be negotiating from a difficult position. The poor liquidity and high trading costs associated with small firms creates an obstacle for investment managers seeking to capture their returns through simple indexing. Replicating a stock index entails purchasing the correct number of shares in a portfolio to match the securities' weights in the index. This approach has worked very well for strategies attempting to track a large company index such as the Standard & Poor's 500.


Low-cost passive investing has withstood a hailstorm of criticism since inception over 25 years ago, and delivered satisfying results for many of the world's largest investors. Active management continues to deliver performance that both delights or disappoints investors in an unpredictable fashion. Structured investing attempts to combine the best of both the broad diversification, low cost, and low turnover of passive strategies with an active component that seeks to add value not through forecasting but through engineering and execution.

## Conclusion

As an inspection of the table and the chart accompanying this article should make plain, equities can be expected to produce returns that are superior to fixed dollar claims *in the long run*. However, returns on common stock are highly variable, not only year-to-year, but also within categories of common stock, and there is a place for some fixed-income holdings in most portfolios. Such an inspection should also reveal that attempting to determine which types of investment will do best *in the short term* is a fool's errand.

That we tend to overweigh large-capitalization value stocks because they have had the most favorable returns in relation to volatility, does not mean that we recommend ignoring all growth stocks or foreign issues. To repeat, we believe that index funds with low turnover and low expenses are the best way to go about this.

Note: Much of this article was adapted from "Ways to Invest" by Weston Wellington of Dimensional Fund Advisors, Inc.



## WHITHER MA BELL?

**F**or many years, American Telephone & Telegraph was the largest, in terms of capitalization, and most widely held common stock. It was the first stock ever owned by many investors and most investors have held it at one time or another. AT&T was one of the few major corporations that maintained its dividends through the years of the Great Depression and its \$9.00-per-share annual dividend (paid at a time when the minimum wage was \$0.25 per hour) provided much-needed income for many families.

The historic basis of its success was its ability to convince regulators that it needed to function as a monopoly (so that service to rural and low-traffic residential customers could be subsidized by overcharging businesses and other high volume callers). Growth came from decreased costs from improved technology that was developed in the renowned Bell Labs. These advances facilitated rate decreases, especially for long-distance service, which, in turn, fostered much higher usage. The fact that its equipment, manufactured by wholly-owned Western Electric, was leased rather than sold to consumers, served to stabilize revenues.

This cozy situation began to unravel when competitors began to offer cheaper long-distance service by linking local telephones in different cities by microwave and fiber optic lines that bypassed the Bell systems monopoly and when regulators decided that customers could hook up their own equipment to the Bell system's lines. By the time the Justice Department's suit to "break up" the Bell system came along, telephone executives were actually looking forward to getting out of the fetters of the old monolithic structure of the telecommunications industry.

The local operating companies (baby bells) were spun-off to AT&T stockholders as 7 separate companies in early 1984. Subsequent spin-offs included Western Electric, which became Lucent, and the ill-fated NCR Corp., which had been acquired by AT&T in an effort to enter the personal computer business.

## What's Left?


The right column of the accompanying chart shows the value of the various spinoffs from AT&T on the assumption that the holder of 100 shares prior to the 1984 breakup has held on to every spun-off stock he or she received (the chart does not reflect dividends or other cash distributions). As this clearly indicates, it has been the "baby bells" (recombined and renamed) that have accounted for most of the increase in the value of the investor's holdings since December 1983. In fact, since the spin-offs of Lucent and NCR, the value of the investor's AT&T stock is now worth less than it was at the end of 1983. This reflects the fact that most of what was in AT&T 17 years ago is now in other companies.

AT&T now has 4 component businesses: Business Services, Consumer Services, Wireless Services, and Broadband. The most troubled of these is Consumer Services, which is essentially residential long-distance service where competition and advancing technology are rapidly driving prices toward zero. Revenues in this division are steadily decreasing. The other three segments are experiencing growing revenues, but they face some severe problems. Business Services, which provides voice and data communications as well as networking services to business and governments, will require investment to replace and upgrade aging fiber optic and other transmission lines.

Wireless Services, although growing rapidly, apparently relies on the older TDMA (time division multiple access) rather than CDMA (code division multiple

access) technology that is better suited to non-voice (internet) wireless communication, and which is used by its major competitors here and in the rest of the world. Broadband provides traditional video as well as digital video and high-speed data and telephone service over cable TV systems, most of which were recently purchased by AT&T. The company's plans to expand its services over cable have been set back by a variety of regulatory issues. In order to service the huge debt burden it has taken upon itself mainly to purchase cable systems and to conserve funds for needed capital expenditures, the Board of Directors recently cut its guarterly dividend to \$0.0375 from \$0.22.


In addition, the company has stated its intention to further restructure itself by creating 4 new tradable entities either as "asset-based" or "tracking" stocks, from its 4 component businesses. The details, other than the already completed sale of about 16% of its wireless services business as an IPO last summer, are unclear. Presumably there will be additional public offerings, exchange offers, and/or spinoffs. AT&T itself is expected to keep only the Business Services and the name. The apportionment of the company's debt among the 4 entities remains to be seen.



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In short, AT&T has been attempting to reinvent itself and its attempts have been unsuccessful to date, as evidenced by the sharp decrease in its common stock price during the second half of the year. On the basis of its old \$0.88 annual dividend, the decline in AT&T stock price brought it onto the list of the highest-yielding Dow stocks (it was no. 3 as of December 15) and it qualified for purchase in our mechanical "alternative" strategy (see below) during 4 months this fall. The December 20th dividend cut to an indicated \$.015 annual rate will remove AT&T from both lists next month.

It is possible, of course, that the 4 en-



tities that AT&T stockholders can now expect to wind up owning will be worth more than the recent AT&T stock price. However, the uncertainties of competition and of the technologies of its services (which are a far cry from the company's traditional environment), its huge debt load, and the fact that its cable acquisitions were made at what now appear to have been highly inflated prices, mean that such a favorable outcome is far from assured. Those who are rigidly following the alternative model will continue to own AT&T (and any future spin-offs) for the next 14 to 18 months.

and duplicating the model immediately.

However, only investors with sizable portfo-

lios should attempt to track the exact per-

centages month to month. To avoid exces-

sive transaction costs, investors should ad-

just their holdings toward the percentages

below only when commissions are less than

1% of the value of a trade. By making such

adjustments from time to time, investors

should achieve results roughly equal to the

gram provides professional and disciplined

application of this alternative strategy for in-

dividual accounts. For accounts of \$100,000

or more, the fees and expenses of AIS discre-

tionary portfolio management programs are

comparable to those of most mutual funds.

Contact us for information on this and our

other discretionary investment management

Our HYD Investment Management Pro-

future performance of the model.

## ALTERNATIVE HIGH-YIELD DOW INVESTMENT STRATEGY

We are convinced that long-term common stock investors will receive superior returns if they consistently purchase (and hold) higher-yielding Dow stocks from a listing such as that on the opposite page. Selecting from such lists is not a "cut and dried" process, however. Individual circumstances and a variety of ad hoc decisions will determine the timing of purchases and sales.

In our monthly listings, a given issue may retain a  $\star$  or a  $\Leftrightarrow$  for months, even years, at a time. As a result, investment (and reinvestment of sales proceeds) in particular stocks will vary with each individual investor. This means that, while it would be possible to calculate total returns (dividends and capital gains) for a specific investor, it is not possible to compute such returns on our recommendations per se.

Our parent has exhaustively researched many possible High-Yield Dow approaches, "backtesting" various possible selections from the DJIA ranked by yield for various holding periods. For the 35 years ended in December 1998, it was found that the best combination of total return and risk (volatility) was obtained by purchasing the 4 highest yielding issues and holding them for 18 months. (For a thorough discussion of the strategy for investing in the highest-yielding stocks in the DJIA, please read AIER's booklet, "How to Invest Wisely, with Toward an Optimal Stock Selection Strategy," 139 pp. \$9.)

In our model described below, which is distinct from the table on the opposite page, about one-eighteenth of the portfolio is devoted to the 4 issues eligible each month. (We say "about" because various adjustments and rebalancings are needed to ensure that both the composition of the model portfolio and its returns are independent of when it is presumed to have been initiated.) Eligible issues include the 4 highest-yielding Dow issues that are neither General Motors nor Philip Morris. A HYD strategy derives much of its effectiveness because it "forces" the investor to purchase sound companies when they are out of favor and sell them when they return to relative popularity. We exclude GM because its erratic dividend history has usually rendered its relative yield ineffective as a means of signaling timely purchases, especially when it has ranked no. 4 or higher on

the list. We have chosen to exclude Philip Morris also, because, in present circumstances, it seem unlikely that there will be sufficient "good news" for it to be sold out of the model portfolio, whatever its ups and downs, unless it is specifically excluded. The hypothetical trades used to compute the composition of the model (as well as the returns on the model and the full list of 30 Dow stocks) are based on mid-month closing prices, plus or minus \$0.125 per share.

This month, the strategy sold some Chevron, which is no longer in the Dow, and some Minnesota Mining and J.P. Morgan to buy Caterpillar, A.T.& T., and Dupont. These transactions assume the investor has been following the model for at least 18 months. Investors following the model for less than 18 months would be buying all 4 eligible stocks, using one-eighteenth of their total portfolio each month. Investors can also accumulate portfolios that approximate the model in less than 18 months by "jumping in"

As of December 15, 20	cent of Pe	ortfolio*							
715 OF December 15, 20	Rank	Yield	Price	Ctature	Value		No. Shares‡‡		
				Status		1	NO. SHATES++		
Philip Morris	1 5.29% 40.0625		*	-0-		-0-			
Eastman Kodak	2	4.61%	38.1875	Holding**	14.8		18.9		
A.T.&T.	3	4.19%	21.0000	Buying	5.1		12.4		
General Motors	4	3.72%	53.8125	*	-0-		-0-		
Caterpillar	5	3.33%	3.33% 40.8125		ng 20.3		25.4		
Dupont	6	3.20%	43.7500	Buying	9.7		11.3		
Int'l Paper	7	2.68%	37.3750	Holding	7.0		9.5		
Morgan, J.P.	8	2.50%	160.0000	Selling	23.1		7.3		
Exxon Mobil	n Mobil 9 2.09% 84.		84.1250	0					
Minn.Mng.& Mfg.	10	2.07%	113.6250	Selling	10.4		4.7		
Proctor & Gamble	11	1.91%	71.3750	0					
SBC Communications	12	1.62%	53.6875	Holding	1.7		1.6		
				0					
Chevron	-	3.32%	78.2500	Selling	4.6		3.0		
Goodyear Tire	-	6.63%	18.0900	Holding	0.5		1.4		
Sears, Roebuck	-	2.77%	33.2200	Holding	2.8		<u>4.5</u>		
				0	100.0		100.0		
Change in Portfolio Value‡									
						From	Std.		
	1 mo.	. 1 y	r. 5 yrs.	10 yrs.	15 yrs.	12/63	Dev.		
Alt. Strategy	2.1%	0.8	16.6%	20.2%	19.6	16.5%	18.7		
Dow	-2.4%			17.3%	16.6%	11.2%	16.9		
		5.7 /			/ 0				

services.

\* The strategy excludes Philip Morris and General Motors. \*\* Indicated purchases approximately offset by sales of shares purchased 18 months ago. # Assuming all purchases and sales at mid-month prices (+/-\$0.125 per share commissions) reinvestment of all dividends and interest, and no taxes. The 5, 10 and 15year total returns are annualized as are the total returns and the standard deviations of those returns since , December 1963. ## Because the percentage of each issue in the portfolio by value reflects the prices shown in the table, we are also showing the number of *shares* of each stock as a percentage of the total number of shares in the entire portfolio.

Note: These calculations are based on hypothetical trades following very exacting stock selection strategies. They do not reflect returns on actual investments or previous recommendations of AIS. Past performance may differ from future results.

## THE DOW JONES INDUSTRIALS RANKED BY YIELD

High-Yield Dow investors' returns have been boosted by recoveries in three "old economy" giants during the fourth quarter.

Caterpillar made a number of positive announcements starting off with a very strong third quarter earnings performance of \$0.62 per share, \$0.04 higher than Wall Street estimates. The company announced anticipated earnings growth for the years 2000 and 2001. This optimism is based on the company's expectation of renewed world-wide demand for agricultural equipment and expected growth of its electric power generating equipment sales, which have become Caterpillar's fastest growing product line. The company recently entered into an agreement with DaimlerChrysler to jointly develop medium-duty engines, fuel systems, and other powertrain components. Daimler, like many other European car manufacturers, has historically used diesel engines in most of the vehicles it has produced.

International Paper recently rolled back its fourth quarter earnings estimate to \$0.30 per share, far below Wall Street earlier consensus of \$0.44 per share. However, after an initial decline on the announcement, the company's share price recovered to a new eight-month high. Analysts look positively on the company's quick action to reduce production at some of its wood and paper production facilities. The company is aggressively moving forward with the sale of milling and production facilities obtained in recent mergers that do not fit with the company's three core businesses, i.e., paper, packaging, and forest products. The integration of International Paper and Champion International is ahead of forecasts, and has produced cost savings of \$500 million. The company anticipates a cut in capital spending of 20% from \$1.5 billion in 2000 to \$1.2 billion in 2001. The company also anticipates

completing asset sales of \$5 billion by the end of 2001.

Goodyear Tire remains a hold, despite its removal from the Dow. The company's original equipment sales are expected to decline with production cutbacks by major automobile producers. As a result of increased raw material, labor, and energy costs cited as the cause of loss announced for the third quarter, the company recently announced price increases in its growing replacement tire business. So far, this has not resulted in a loss of market share because the company seems to have been a major beneficiary of the Firestone recall. The company's worldwide tire sales in the third quarter were 8.7% more than the third quarter 1999. This includes a significant contribution from sales of Dunlop tires, purchased from Sumitomo Tire in the third quarter of 1999. Unit sales for the first nine months of 2000 were 15.8% higher than during the same period in 1999.

	Ticker	Months On/(Off)				— 12-Ма	nth	—— Lã	test Divide Record	— Indicated — Annual Yield†		
	Symbol	Top 10		11/15/00		— 12-MC High	Low	Amount	Date	Paid	Dividend	(%)
Philip Morris ★ Eastman Kodak AT&T ★ General Motors †	MO EK T GM	94 27 7 59	\$40.06 \$38.19 \$21.00 \$53.81	35.75 47.75 20.56 57.81	23.56 60.31 54.50 71.25	41.75 <i>H</i> 67.81 61.00 94.63	18.69 35.31 18.25 <i>L</i> 48.44 <i>L</i>	0.530 0.440 0.220 0.500	12/15/00 12/01/00 9/29/00 11/16/00	1/10/01 1/02/01 11/01/00 12/09/00	2.120 1.760 0.880 2.000	5.29 4.61 4.19 3.72
<ul> <li>★ Caterpillar</li> <li>☆ DuPont</li> <li>★ International Paper</li> <li>★ J. P. Morgan</li> <li>☆ Exxon Mobil</li> </ul>	CAT DD IP JPM XOM MMM	20 14/(32) 13 86 2/(7) 74	\$40.81 \$43.75 \$37.38 \$160.00 \$84.13 \$112.19	36.69 43.44 36.00 150.63 90.38 95.38	46.52 65.04 55.82 130.38 83.06 95.25	55.13 74.00 60.00 187.63 95.44 119.00 <i>H</i>	29.00 38.19 26.31 104.88 69.88 78.19	$\begin{array}{c} 0.300\\ 0.340\\ 0.350\\ 0.250\\ 1.000\\ 0.440\\ 0.580\end{array}$	1/22/01 11/15/00 11/24/00 9/25/00 11/13/00 11/24/00	2/20/01 12/14/00 12/15/00 10/13/00 12/11/00 12/12/00	$\begin{array}{c} 1.360\\ 1.400\\ 1.000\\ 4.000\\ 1.760\\ 2.320\end{array}$	3.72 3.33 3.20 2.68 2.50 2.09 2.07
<ul> <li>★ Minn. Min. &amp; Mfg.</li> <li>Procter &amp; Gamble</li> <li>☆ SBC Comm.</li> <li>Alcoa (s)</li> <li>Honeywell Intl.</li> <li>Merck</li> <li>Johnson &amp; Johnson</li> <li>Coca-Cola</li> <li>United Tech.</li> <li>Citigroup * (s)</li> <li>General Electric (s)</li> </ul>	PG SBC AA HON MRK JNJ KO UTX C GE	(3)	\$71.38 \$53.69 \$30.94 \$47.88 \$90.38 \$98.56 \$53.50 \$71.19 \$48.06 \$49.81	<ul> <li>57.36</li> <li>73.38</li> <li>57.31</li> <li>29.25</li> <li>51.63</li> <li>91.63</li> <li>95.00</li> <li>61.31</li> <li>67.06</li> <li>50.19</li> <li>52.50</li> </ul>	95.25 112.63 52.06 39.50 60.79 71.69 94.67 59.88 58.13 54.50 48.10	119.00 A 118.38 59.00 43.63 63.88 96.69 H 103.00 66.88 77.19 H 59.13 60.50	52.75 34.81 23.13 32.13 52.00 66.13 42.88 46.50 35.34 41.65	0.350 0.254	10/20/00 10/10/00 11/03/00 11/20/00 12/08/00 11/21/00 12/01/00 11/17/00 11/06/00 10/03/00	12/12/00 11/01/00 11/02/01 12/08/00 1/02/01 12/12/00 12/15/00 12/15/00 12/10/00 11/22/00 10/25/00	2.320 1.400 1.010 0.500• 0.750 1.360 1.280 0.680 0.900 0.560 0.550	2.07 1.96 1.88 1.62 1.57 1.50 1.30 1.27 1.26 1.17 1.10
Boeing Hewlett-Packard (s) Walt Disney McDonald's IBM American Express (s) Wal-Mart Stores Home Depot, Inc.(s) Intel Corp. (s) Microsoft Corp.	BA HWP DIS MCD IBM AXP WMT HD INTC MSFT		\$64.88 \$31.63 \$29.38 \$31.50 \$87.81 \$54.63 \$49.88 \$41.94 \$32.44 \$49.19	63.56 35.31 31.81 33.31 99.38 57.69 49.00 39.63 41.50 70.06	38.75 50.57 28.88 41.81 107.00 52.73 66.01 62.33 39.47 108.44	70.94 <i>H</i> 68.09 43.88 43.63 134.94 63.00 70.25 70.00 75.81 119.94	32.00 30.50 27.75 26.38 86.94 39.83 41.44 34.69 31.25 <i>L</i> 48.44	0.170 0.080 0.210 0.215 0.130 0.080 0.060 0.040 0.020 0.000	2/09/01 12/20/00 12/08/00 11/15/00 11/15/00 11/10/00 1/05/01 12/22/00 11/30/00 11/07/00	3/02/01 1/10/01 12/22/00 12/01/00 12/09/00 2/09/01 1/08/01 12/14/00 12/01/00	$\begin{array}{c} 0.680\\ 0.320\\ 0.210\\ 0.220\\ 0.520\\ 0.320\\ 0.240\\ 0.160\\ 0.080\\ 0.000\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1.05 \\ 1.01 \\ 0.71 \\ 0.70 \\ 0.59 \\ 0.59 \\ 0.48 \\ 0.38 \\ 0.25 \\ 0.00 \end{array}$
☆ Chevron ☆ Goodyear Sears, Roebuck	CHV GT S	(14) (14) (14)	\$78.25 \$18.09 \$33.22	83.94 18.10 31.46	89.94 28.13 31.25	94.88 31.63 43.50	69.94 15.60 25.25	0.650 0.300 0.230	11/17/00 11/16/00 11/30/00	12/11/00 12/15/00 1/02/01	2.600 1.200 0.920	3.32 6.63 2.77

★ BUY.  $\Leftrightarrow$  HOLD.  $\dagger$  Based on indicated dividends and market price as of 12/15/00. *H* New 52-week high. *L* New 52-week low. (s) All data adjusted for splits. • Excludes extras. \* Travelers Group merged with Citibank as of 10/8/98 to form Citigroup.  $\ddagger$  Spinoff of 0.69893 shares of Delphi Automotive per share of GM on 5/29/99.

Note: The count in months for the Top 10 issues indicates how long they have ranked among the Top 10. Issues are recommended for purchase ( $\star$ ) after having been among the Top 10 for 12 or more consecutive months, but this period can be changed if conditions warrant. Issues recommended for retention ( $\dot{\alpha}$ ) had qualified for purchase, but subsequently ranked no. 11 or lower and the monthly count (in parentheses) indicates how long ago they left the Top 10. If an issue became a  $\dot{\alpha}$ , but subsequently returned to the Top 10, both monthly counts are shown.

## **RECENT MARKET STATISTICS**

Precious Metals &	Securities Markets										
r recibus metals o											
		Mo. Earlier	Yr. Earlier					12/15/00	Mo. Earlier	Yr. Earlier	
Gold, London p.m. fixing	270.35 4.61	264.60	280.05		00 Stock Co			1,312.15	1,389.81	1,413.32	
Silver, London Spot Price	4.66	5.19	Dow Jones Industrial Average				0,434.96	10,707.60	11,225.32		
Copper, COMEX Spot Price	0.83	0.82		Dow Jones Transportation Average			2,698.68	2,841.01	2,919.54		
Crude Oil, W. Texas Int. Spot	35.58	26.38		Dow Jones Utilities Average			386.52	388.20	272.19		
Dow Jones Spot Index	112.68	111.02	116.14		Dow Jones Bond Average			96.57	95.60	98.29	
Dow Jones-AIG Futures Index	112.06	110.94	91.66		Nasdaq Composite			2,653.27	3,165.49	3,621.95	
CRB-Bridge Futures Index	227.41	226.83	203.69		Financial Times Gold Mines Index		dex	664.06	571.59	901.00	
0					ican Gold M			676.56	624.53	1,072.43	
					stralasian G			802.38	711.28	1,072.48	
Interest	Rates (%)	)		FT No	FT North American Gold Mines         637.83         531.92         81						
U.S. Treasury bills - 91 day	6.00	6.35	5.32								
182 day	5.97	6.34	5.66				<b>Coin Price</b>	es			
52 week	5.64	6.14	5.82				12/15/00	Mo Farli	er Yr. Earlier	Promium	
U.S. Treasury bonds - 15 year	5.56	5.93	6.56	Amorica	n Eagle (1.0	20)	\$277.45	271.65	284.90	2.63	
Corporates:					100-Coror		\$264.43	258.93	270.43	-0.23	
High Quality - 10+ year	7.27	7.61	7.49				\$67.15	65.75	68.55	5.51	
Medium Quality - 10+ year	8.02	8.25	7.97		overeign (0 In Maple Le		\$277.70	271.90	284.10	2.72	
Federal Reserve Discount Rate	6.00	6.00	5.00						333.90		
New York Prime Rate	9.50	9.50	8.50		1 50-Peso (1		\$326.50 \$270.60	319.70 265.00	276.70	0.17 0.09	
Euro Rates 3 month		5.17	3.46		n Ounce (1.						
Government bonds - 10 year	4.86	5.18	5.00		in Krugerrai		\$275.45	269.75	281.65	1.89	
Swiss Rates - 3 month		3.50	1.99		uble Eagle-			245.00	200.00	22.05	
Government bonds - 10 year	3.69	3.81	na		udens (MS-		\$347.50	345.00	390.00	32.85	
Government bolids - To year	3.09	5.01	na		y (Type I-Al		\$675.00	675.00	675.00	158.06	
					y (Type II-A		\$425.00	435.00	435.00	62.48	
Exchan	ge Rates				y (Type III-A		\$314.00	312.50	370.00	20.05	
	-	1 42 4000	1 (1 1000		/er Coins (\$ Silver (715 c		\$4,000.00	3,900.00	4,250.00	21.35	
	1.471000		1.614800		Silver (292 d		\$1,550.00	1,537.50	1,612.50	15.15	
	0.655800	0.644200	0.674700			JZ.)					
	0.894100	0.856700	1.014400		Dollars		\$5,700.00	5,700.00	6,825.00	59.83	
	0.008892 0.130400	0.009186	0.009709						price and value		
	0.130100	0.162600						er ounce. The	weight in troy		
Swiss Franc \$	0.594900	0.560900	0.633700	ounces o	t the preciou	is metal in co	oins is indicat	ed in parentl	leses.		
			Select	ed Mutua	l Funds						
	Ticker		Month	Year	— 52-V	Veek —	Distrib	utions Lates	t 12 Months	Yield	
	Symbol	12/15/		Earlier	High	Low	Incon		apital Gains	(%)	
★ Duff & Phelps Utilities Income	,	\$10.5		8.63	10.50	8.25	0.78		0.0000	7.43	
★ T Rowe Price European Stock	PRESX	\$19.7		22.13	25.32	19.78	0.30		3.3200	1.52	
★ Vanguard European Stk Index	VEURX	\$25.3		27.54	29.85	24.16	0.50		0.2000	1.97	
☆ Vanguard REIT Index	VGSIX	\$11.6		9.38	11.98	9.38	0.80		0.0000	6.88	
$\star$ Vanguard Growth Index	VIGRX	\$31.7		38.90	42.38	31.72	0.00		0.9050	0.50	
★ Fidelity Target Timeline 2003	FTARX	\$9.2		9.15	9.25	8.88	0.65		0.0000	7.05	
				9.13	9.23 9.74	9.53	0.64		0.0003	6.71	
★ USAA Short Term Bond	USSBX	\$9.6				9.55					
★ Vanguard Short Term Corp	VFSTX	\$10.6	<b>2</b> 10.54	10.56	10.62	10.33	0.70	138	0.0000	6.63	
		North Am	erican and	Diversifi	ed Mining	g Compan	ies				
	Ticker		Month	Year	— 52-V	Veek —	Indicated /	Annual	Payment	Yield	
	Symbol	12/15/	00 Earlier	Earlier	High	Low	Net Divid	lends	Schedule	(%)	
Agnico-Eaglet	AEM	\$6.0	<b>6</b> 5.13	6.63	7.94	4.88	0.02	20	Annual	0.33	
★ Barrick Gold Corp.† ABX		\$15.9		17.75	20.00	12.31	0.02		Semiannual	1.38	
Battle Mountain Gold BMG		\$1.6		2.31	2.88	1.25	0.00		-	0.00	
Freeport-McMoran C&G, Cl.A		\$7.7		14.31	18.75	6.75	0.00		_	0.00	
★ Homestake Mining	HM	\$4.3		8.06	8.50	3.50	0.00		- Semiannual	1.16	
★ Newmont Mining	NEM	\$16.1		23.13	28.38	3.50 12.75	0.05		Quarterly	0.74	
★ Placer Domet	PDG	\$9.4		10.75	12.19	7.25	0.12		Semiannual	1.06	
★ Rio Tinto PLC‡	RTP	\$9.4 \$66.0		86.00	97.25	55.13	2.30		Semiannual	3.48	
A NO TINO FLC+	NIF	<b>\$00.</b> 0	01.30	00.00	97.23	55.15	2.30	10	Sermannual	3.40	

#### South African Mining Companies, Finance Houses and Investment Trusts

	Ticker Symbol <b>12/15/0</b>		Month Earlier	Year Earlier	— 52-V High	— 52-Week — High Low		ADR Net Dividends• and Ex-Dividend Dates			
ASA Ltd.	ASA	\$14.56	14.44	19.00	20.88	14.06	-	-	-	0.600°	4.12
Anglo American PLC <sup>2</sup>	AAUK	\$52.25	55.23	64.38	71.00	36.75	4/05/00	1.060	9/20/00	0.580	3.14
★ Anglogold Ltd. <sup>3</sup>	AU	\$14.13	13.31	24.31	28.69	12.25	2/23/00	0.834	8/09/00	0.511	9.52
Avgold Ltd.	AVGLY	\$3.74	3.32	6.54	7.50	3.11	N	o Divide	ends Decla	red	
De Beers Consolidated Mines	DBRSY	\$26.13	29.19	29.13	31.75	18.19	3/29/00	0.675	9/13/00	0.345	3.90
Gencor Ltd.	GNCRY	\$3.68	4.03	3.97	4.68	2.27	3/29/00	0.041	9/13/00	0.164	5.57
★ Gold Fields Ltd. <sup>4</sup>	GOLD	\$3.28	2.72	4.78	5.69	2.56	9/15/99	0.045	2/16/00	0.026	2.16

★ Buy. ☆ Hold. (s) All data adjusted for splits. † Dividend shown is after 15% Canadian tax withholding. ‡ Dividend shown is after 15% U.K. tax withholding on a portion of the total. na Not applicable. • Paid or announced last 12 months. ° Total dividend paid in latest 12 months. ¹ Closed-end fund—traded on the NYSE. Dividends paid monthly. ² Anglo American Gold Inv. Co. merger in Anglo American plc. ³ Formerly Vaal Reefs plus interests in Free State, Western Deep, Ergo, Elandsrand and others. 2 ADRs = 1 ordinary share. ⁴ Gold Fields Ltd. and Driefontonein Consolidated merged to form Gold Fields, Ltd. e Estimated.

The information herein is derived from generally reliable sources, but cannot be guaranteed. American Investment Services, the American Institute for Economic Research, and the officers, employees, or other persons affiliated with either organization may from time to time have positions in the investments referred to herein.